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Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and Law is the product of extensive experi-
ence in teaching psychiatry and psychoanalytic principles to law stu-
dents. Like Katz and Goldstein's The Family and the Law, the book
is a collection of coursework materials, combining technical, non-legal
papers with illustrative legal cases. This approach follows the philos-
ophy of teaching propounded by Jay Katz in 1959 when he wrote that
psychoanalytic thinking would be best imparted to law students
through the teaching of case abstracts of those legal decisions where
psychiatric testimony may or may not have been pertinent.,
The text is broken into two long chapters which, according to the
authors, are in effect two books in one cover. The first is entitled
"Psychoanalysis and Law," and is designed to encourage lawyers "to
view law generally as an ordering process, and to pose questions about
its assumptions, procedures, and participants." 2 It is designed to be
taught by an interdisciplinary team of a lawyer and a psychoanalyst.
The authors do not apologize for presenting a one-sided strongly
orthodox Freudian orientation in this section. They state that they are
more familiar with that approach and feel that it alone endeavors to
formulate a systematic theory of human behavior: "All other theories
rest on assumptions derived from it or on challenges to it."3 The book
does not contain clinical descriptions of mental illnesses or syndromes;
nor are there references to treatment techniques. It is in its first chap-
ter a magnificent synthesis and selection of pertinent papers showing
the evolution of Freudian analytic theory from Freud's early clinical
studies on hysteria through the evolution of topographic and struc-
tural theories, with comments from such recent analytical theoreticians
as Waelder, Rappaport, and Eric Erickson. This analytic material is
illustrated by and serves to illustrate theoretical and practical legal
problems.
The second chapter, for which chapter one is not a prerequisite,
is called "Law and Psychiatry." It returns the lawyer to his more famil-
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iar role as participant in a particular legal process, "the process of
invocation, administration, and appraisal of mental health laws." 4 The
authors feel that this chapter may be taught either by a lawyer or an
interdisciplinary group of a psychoanalyst and a lawyer.
The material in this chapter has a more pragmatic legal basis, deal-
ing with those questions in which psychiatric problems and legal issues
are most intertwined. In the words of the authors, it deals with action
in psychiatry and forms of action in law. In this chapter problems of
dangerousness, treatability, commitment, and supervision of institu-
tions are reviewed and discussed.
In their introduction, the authors state that they intend this book
to be a model for others to use, and it is certainly a needed model. The
eminence of the authors and the Yale Law School, where they devel-
oped the basic theory for teaching psychiatry, is such that the present
volume may be expected to encourage other institutions to formulate
such interdisciplinary law and psychiatry courses. It is in the light of
this great potential influence that one must ask whether this volume
meets the needs it so effectively underscores.
The book fits much better with models of legal texts than it does
with the kinds of books with which the medical profession is familiar.
For this reason, at least, there is a certain presumption involved in a
psychiatrist's undertaking to review the book. It has been noted, how-
ever, that the course is designed to be taught by a psychiatrist as well
as a lawyer. Indeed, it is from the point of view of someone approach-
ing this kind of teaching for the first time that the book's shortcomings
are most apparent. These consist primarily of a failure to clarify objec-
tives. Thus, for example, the authors do not explain for whom the
coursework material is intended, nor whether it is designed to be
taught in addition to other courses in psychiatry or as the law student's
only exposure to these problems. The subtleties of the interdisciplin-
ary approach are also unexplained. It remains unclear whether this
book conveys to a psychiatrist the very different quality of teaching
in a law school and the different approach of the law student to these
issues, and whether it conveys to the lawyer unfamiliar with psychiatric
teaching those insights into interpersonal behavior which psychiatry
may have to offer. In short, there is scant indication of the influence
which the exposure to this learning might, or is intended to, have on
the future career of the student.
The most disturbing omission, however, is the authors' failure to
share directly the benefits of their long experience with such a course.
The book therefore suffers from a certain lack of direction. While
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the authors introduce each subsection with elegant and provocative
questions, they refrain from any comment of their own. The lack of
such comment is obviously planned, but the reasons for its absence are
somewhat puzzling to the reviewer. The authors do not tie together the
different cases with explanatory or illustrative notes. The question
arises whether such a pioneering work from a pioneering institution
should remain purely a collection of coursework material or whether it
must be made more challenging and constructive.
The way the authors handle the issue of responsibility is rather char-
acteristic of the book in general. First of all, they do not have a specific
section or chapter devoted to this issue, though it does creep into the
second chapter as "forms of action in law: insanity-defense commit-
ment."5 Certainly it is true that many lawyers and psychiatrists feel
that this is an impossible area, one which has taken up much too much
valuable time, and to which nothing else can be added. However, there
is no explanation of this kind provided. In the first chapter the authors
have inserted an article by Oliver Wendell Holmes in which the
philosophical postulates of the validity of responsibility as an issue are
stated. In a different section of the book there is a paper which follows
this up in which a psychoanalytical theoretician discusses the issues of
determinism, "freedom," and psychotherapy.7 These papers might
have been illustrated with some unifying comment, which would have
been an excellent prelude to the section dealing with forms of action
in psychiatry.8 In this section the American psychiatric nomenclature
is quoted in full without any of the very pertinent comments and criti-
cisms that have been made by authors and authorities. The use of this
nomenclature is qualified only in a discussion by Norman Cameron,
who gives his own views regarding the classification of mental illness.9
However, unless one recognizes that this is only one of many schools of
5 P. 593.
6 When a man has "a distinct defect of such a nature that all can recognize it as
making certain precautions impossible[,] [h]e will not be held answerable for not taking
them." This is further developed and qualified into: "There is no doubt that in many
cases a man may be insane and yet perfectly capable of taking the precautions and of
being influenced by the motives which the circumstances demand." P. 79.
7 "Yes, I puzzled quite a bit over the paradox of psychic determinism v. effort [in
psychotherapy], and have not yet reconciled it to my satisfaction. One can say that the
effort itself is also determined-which seems to be something of a tour de force-or one
can concede that, especially in psychotherapy, one expects and mobilizes more effort than
the amount which is yet "determined" by previous experience. Such factors as transference
(in therapy), inspirational influences, and conceptions of one's self or one's completed
work, projected into the future, may be regarded as determining factors, but I still, at
this stage of my thinking at least, feel there is something left over." P. 871.
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criticism, the point is lost. Neither the nomenclature, nor Cameron's
views, nor the reprint of a case discussion from a psychiatric hospital
serves to bring home the fact that diagnostic criteria as such do not
serve to answer the question of sanity or insanity or, for that matter,
issues of commitability. The lack of comment on the staff discussion in
particular seemed regrettable to the reviewer, because all it illustrated
was that psychiatrists in discussions very often will talk off the top of
their heads while hammering out their own impressions of a problem
in the same way that lawyers and judges might talk in the chambers
prior to a court session, In view of the proclivity of law students to
argue from the particular to the general, or from a precedent to the
case in point, it may be asked how fair or illustrative an inclusion this
really is.
The authors have obviously and intentionally, one assumes, omitted
discussion of the M'Naghten rules, the New Hampshire laws, the more
recent attempts in Massachusetts at providing impartial psychiatric
testimony in all cases, and the Weintraub ptoposals. The reasoning
behind this particular omission is again unclear.
This, then, is the paradox of this book-that it leaves the reader
with too many loose ends. The ambiguities may only accentuate the
difficulties already experienced and dissuade many from pursuing this
and similar interdisciplinary ventures. There is no doubt, therefore,
that another book from the authors-a synthesis of this material and
of their teaching ekperience-would be a most valuable and needed
addition. Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and Law serves mainly to whet the
appetite for this further project. The book serves as a model for an
interdisciplinary group teaching psychoanalytically oriented psychiatry
to what would seem to be a select, probably graduate, group of law
students. But it is not designed to fulfill the needs of the average law-
yer who may want to be exposed to some general principles of psy-
chiatry.
John M. Suarez, on the basis of questionnaires sent to all ABA
approved law schools, divided the philosophy of approach in teaching
psychiatry to law students into distinct schools.' 0 One school he called
"that which favored the teaching of techniques, facts, details, and
terminology, so as to equip the member of the other profession with
down-to-earth, practical information that will have a direct bearing on
his daily activities."' The other group is one that "finds this approach
meaningless and potentially dangerous. They encourage the avoidance
10 Suarez, Reciprocal EdUcation-A Key to Psychiatric-Legal Dilemma, 17 J. LEGAL ED.
316 (1965).
11 Id. at 320.
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of technical and detailed training, in favor of exposure to the philos-
ophy, orientation and thinking of the other's profession."12 Suarez
comments that the former is viewed with greater favor by the student,
the latter by the faculty. It is, I think, appropriate to remark that this
particular book and the coursework that it illustrates fall into the
second category and therefore in some ways do not meet the average
law student's perceived needs. It does not of itself fulfill Judge
Weihofen's recommendations: "If law training is to include any basic
understanding of human behavior as related to the specific problems
encountered by lawyers, it must be provided in the law school curric-
ulum.' 3 Certainly, to illustrate some of the issues in teaching psychi-
atry to law students, extensive use has to be made of clinical presenta-
tions and interviewing of patients. It is in this respect that the book
does not fulfill the need for a model course because, while the reality
of the law student is his law library, the reality of the study and under-
standing of man is man himself.
12 Id.
13 Weihofen, Comment on McDonald, The Teaching of Psychiatry in Law Schools,
49 J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 310, 315 (1958).
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